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1 Introduction
In Proposition 4 of Kamien and Tauman (1986) it was argued that in an oligopoly when the
number of firms is small (or very large), strategy to enter the market and at the same time
license the cost-reducing technology to the incumbent firm (license with entry strategy) is more
profitable than strategy to license its technology to the incumbent firm without entering the
market (license without entry strategy) for the innovating firm. However, their result depends
on their definition of license fee. They defined the license fee in the case of licenses without
entry by the diﬀerence between the profit of an incumbent firm in that case and its profit before
it buys a license without entry of the innovating firm. However, it is inappropriate from the
game theoretic view point. If an incumbent firm does not buy a license, the innovating firm
may punish the incumbent firm by entering the market. The innovating firm can use such a
threat if and only if it is a credible threat. In a duopoly case with one incumbent firm, when
the innovating firm does not enter nor sell a license, its profit is zero; on the other hand, when
it enters the market without license, its profit is positive. Therefore, threat by entry without
license is credible under duopoly, and then even if the innovating firm does not enter themarket,
the incumbent firm must pay the diﬀerence between its profit when it uses the new technology
and its profit when the innovating firm enters without license as a license fee. For example,
Hattori and Tanaka (2017a) presented analyses of license and entry choice by an innovating
firm in a duopoly.
However, in an oligopoly with more than one incumbent firms, the credibility of threat by
entry is a more subtle problem. In this paper we examine definitions of license fees under
oligopoly with three firms, one outside innovating firm and two incumbent firms, considering
a two-step auction in the case of licenses without entry. Also we suppose that the innovating
firm uses a combination of royalty per output and a fixed license fee.
A two-step auction, for example, in the case of a license to one incumbent firm without entry
is as follows.
1. The first step.
The innovating firm sells a license to one firm at auction without its entry conditional
on that the bidding price must not be smaller than the minimum bidding price, which
is equal to the willingness to pay for the incumbent firms described below, and the
innovating firm imposes a predetermined (positive or negative) royalty per output on the
licensee. A firm with the maximum bidding price gets a license. If both firms make bids
at the same price, one firm is chosen at random. If no firm makes a bid, then the auction
proceeds to the next step.
2. The second step.
The innovating firm sells a license to one firm at auction with its entry.
At the first step of the auction, each incumbent firm has a will to pay the following license fee;
the diﬀerence between its profit when only this firm uses the new technology
without entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only the rival firm buys
the license with entry of the innovating firm.
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In the first step each incumbent firm has an incentive to make a bid when the other firm does
not make a bid. On the other hand, it does not have an incentive to make a bid when the other
firm makes a bid.
We need the minimum bidding price because if there is no minimum price, when one of
the incumbent firms makes a bid which is slightly but strictly smaller than this price, the other
firm does not have an incentive to outperform this bidding.
A two-step auction in the case of licenses to two incumbent firms without entry is similar1,
and at the first step of the auction the incumbent firm has a will to pay the following license
fee;
the diﬀerence between its profit when both firms use the new technology without
entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only the rival firm buys the license
with entry of the innovating firm.
In the first step each incumbent firm has an incentive to make a bid when the other firm
makes a bid because if it does not make a bid, the auction proceed to the next step.
Threat by such a two-step auction is credible if and only if the profit of the innovating firm
when it enters the market with a license to one firm is larger than its profit when it licenses to
one incumbent firm without entering the market.
In the next section we present some literature review. In Section 3 the model of this paper
is described. In Section 4 we consider various equilibria of the oligopoly. In Section 5 we
present an analysis of a royalty and a fixed license fee under the license with entry strategy.
In Section 6 we consider a two-step auction and present an analysis of a royalty and a fixed
license fee under the license without entry strategy. In Sections 5 and 6 the following results
about the optimal royalty rate for the innovator will be shown (see Proposition 1).
Entry with license to one firm case The optimal royalty rate may be positive or negative.
Entry with licenses to two firms case If the goods are strategic complements, the optimal
royalty rate is positive. If the goods are strategic substitutes, it may be positive or
negative.
License to one firmwithout entry cases not using two-step auction If the goods are strate-
gic substitutes, the optimal royalty rate is negative. If the goods are strategic comple-
ments, it may be positive or negative.
License to one firmwithout entry cases using two-step auction If the goods are strategic
substitutes, the optimal royalty rate is negative. If the goods are strategic complements,
it is positive.
Licenses to two firms without entry cases using or not using two-step auction The opti-
mal royalty rate is positive.
In Section 6 also we examine the credibility of two-step auction, and will show the following
results (see Proposition 2).
1Please see Section 6.2.2.
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1. If the cost function of the new technology is linear, the profit of the innovating firm
when it enters the market with a license to one firm and its profit when it licenses to one
incumbent firm without entering the market are equal, that is, entry with license to one
firm case and license to one firm without entry case are equivalent.
2. If the cost function of the new technology is strictly convex, two-step auction is credible.
3. If the cost function of the new technology is strictly concave, two-step auction is not
credible.
In Section 7 we present an example of linear demand and quadratic cost functions. In this
example two-step auction is credible. We will show that when two-step auction is credible,
license to two firms without entry strategy is optimal; on the other hand, when it is not credible,
entry without license strategy is optimal..
2 Literature review
Various studies focus on technology adoption orR&D investment in duopoly or oligopoly. Most
of them analyze the relation between the technology licensor and licensee. The diﬀerence of
means of contracts, which comprise royalties, upfront fixed fees, combinations of these two,
and auctions, are well discussed (Katz and Shapiro (1985)). Kamien and Tauman (2002)
show that outside innovators prefer auctions, but industry incumbents prefer royalty. This topic
is discussed by Kabiraj (2004) under the Stackelberg oligopoly; here, the licensor does not
have production capacity. Wang and Yang (2004) consider the case when the licensor has
production capacity. Sen and Tauman (2007) compared the license system in detail, namely,
when the licensor is an outsider and when it is an incumbent firm, using the combination of
royalties and fixed fees. However, the existence of production capacity was externally given,
and they did not analyze the choice of entry. Therefore, the optimal strategies of outside
innovators, who can use the entry as a threat, require more discussion. Regarding the strategies
of new entrants to the market, Duchene, Sen and Serfes (2015) focused on future entrants
with old technology, and argued that while a low license fee can be used to deter the entry
of potential entrants, the firm with new technology is incumbent, and its choice of entry is
not analyzed. Also, Chen (2016) analyzed the model of the endogenous market structure
determined by the potential entrant with old technology and showed that the licensor uses the
fixed fee and zero royalty in both the incumbent and the outside innovator cases, which are
exogenously given. Creane, Chiu and Konishi (2013) examined a firm that can license its
production technology to a rival when firms are heterogeneous in production costs, and showed
that a complete technology transfer from one firm to another always increases joint profit under
weakly concave demand when at least three firms remain in the industry.
A Cournot oligopoly with fixed fee under cost asymmetry was analyzed by La Manna
(1993). He showed that if technologies can be replicated perfectly, a lower cost firm always has
the incentive to transfer its technology; hence, while a Cournot-Nash equilibrium cannot be
fully asymmetric, there exists no non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. On the
other hand, using cooperative game theory, Watanabe and Muto (2008) analyzed bargaining
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between a licensor with no production capacity and oligopolistic firms. Recent research
focuses on market structure and technology improvement. Boone (2001) and Matsumura et.
al. (2013) found a non-monotonic relation between intensity of competition and innovation.
Also, Pal (2010) showed that technology adoption may change the market outcome. The social
welfare is larger in Bertrand competition than in Cournot competition. However, if we consider
technology adoption, Cournot competition may result in higher social welfare than Bertrand
competition under a diﬀerentiated goods market. Hattori and Tanaka (2015), Hattori and
Tanaka (2016a) studied the adoption of new technology in Cournot duopoly and Stackelberg
duopoly. Rebolledo and Sandonís (2012) presented an analysis of the eﬀectiveness of research
and development (R&D) subsidies in an oligopolistic model in the cases of international
competition and cooperation in R&D. Hattori and Tanaka (2016) analyzed similar problems
about product innovation, that is, introduction of higher quality good in a duopoly with vertical
product diﬀerentiation.
3 Themodel
There are three firms, Firms A, B and C. At present two of them, Firms B and C, produce a
homogeneous good. Firm A, which is an outside firm, has a superior cost-reducing technology
and can produce the good at lower cost than Firms B and C. We call Firm A the innovating
firm, and Firms B and C the incumbent firms. Firm A have the following five options.
1. To enter the market without license to incumbent firms.
2. To enter the market and license its technology to one incumbent firm.
3. To enter the market and license its technology to two incumbent firms.
4. To license its technology to one incumbent firm, but not enter the market.
5. To license its technology to two incumbent firms, but not enter the market.
Let p be the price, xA, xB and xC be the outputs of Firms A, B and C. Then, the inverse
demand function of the good is written as follows.
p = p(xA + xB + xC), when Firm A enters,
p = p(xB + xC), when Firm A does not enter.
It is twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
The cost functions of Firms A, B and C are denoted by cA(xA), cB(xB) and cC(xC). cB(·)
and cC(·) are the same functions without license. If Firm A licenses its technology to two
incumbent firms, all cost functions are the same, and if Firm A licenses its technology to one
incumbent firm (for example Firm C), then the cost functions of Firms A and C are the same.
They are twice continuously diﬀerentiable, and there is no fixed cost; thus cA(0) = cB(0) = 0.
In the cases with licenses the game proceeds as follows. In the first stage Firm A determines
the royalty rate. In the second stage firms determine the outputs, and the fixed license fee is
determined.
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4 Equilibria of the oligopoly
4.1 Entry without license case
We suppose that Firm A enters the market without license to incumbent firms. Then, the
market becomes a tripoly. The cost function of Firm C is cB(xC). The profits of Firms A, B
and C are written as
piA = p(xA + xB + xC)xA − cA(xA),
piB = p(xA + xB + xC)xB − cB(xB),
piC = p(xA + xB + xC)xC − cB(xC).
We assume Cournot type behavior of the firms. The first order conditions for profit maximiza-
tion are
p + p′xA − c′A(xA) = 0,
p + p′xB − c′B(xB) = 0,
p + p′xC − c′B(xC) = 0.
The second order conditions are
2p′ + p′′xA − c′′A(xA) < 0,
2p′ + p′′xB − c′′B(xB) < 0,
2p′ + p′′xC − c′′B(xC) < 0.
Hereafter we assume that the second order conditions in each case are satisfied. Denote the
equilibrium profits in this case by pie0A , pi
e0
B and pi
e0
C .
4.2 License to one firmwithout entry case
Suppose that Firm A licenses its technology to one firm, Firm C, but it does not enter the
market. Then, the market is a duopoly. The cost function of Firm C is cA(xC). Denote the
royalty per output and the fixed license fee by r and L. The profits of the firms are written as
piB = p(xB + xC)xB − cB(xB),
piC = p(xB + xC)xC − cA(xC) − r xC − L.
The first order conditions for profit maximization are
p + p′xB − c′B(xB) = 0, (1a)
p + p′xC − c′A(xC) − r = 0. (1b)
Denote the equilibrium profits and the license fee in this case by pil1B , pi
l1
C and L
l1. Diﬀerentiating
the first order conditions with respect to r , we obtain
dxB
dr
= −p
′ + p′′xB
∆
,
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dxC
dr
=
2p′ + p′′xB − c′′B(xB)
∆
,
where
∆ = (2p′ + p′′xB − c′′B(xB))(2p′ + p′′xC − c′′A(xC)) − (p′ + p′′xB)(p′ + p′′xC).
From the second order conditions and the stability conditions for oligopoly (see Seade (1980)
and Dixit (1986)), we have dxCdr < 0. When the goods of the firms are strategic substitutes,
p′ + p′′xC < 0, and when the goods are strategic complements, p′ + p′′xC > 0. We have
dxB
dr > 0 in the former case, and
dxB
dr < 0 in the latter case.
4.3 Licenses to two firms without entry case
Suppose that Firm A licenses its technology to two firms, Firms B and C, but it does not enter
the market. The cost functions of Firms B and C are cA(·). The profits of the firms are written
as
piB = p(xB + xC)xB − cA(xB) − r xB − L,
piC = p(xB + xC)xC − cA(xC) − r xC − L.
The first order conditions for profit maximization are
p + p′xB − c′A(xB) − r = 0,
p + p′xC − c′A(xC) − r = 0.
Denote the equilibrium profits and the license fee in this case by pil2B , pi
l2
C and L
l2. In this case
we have xB = xC and pil2B = pi
l2
C , Diﬀerentiating the first order conditions with respect to r , we
obtain
dxB
dr
=
dxC
dr
=
p′ − c′′A(xB)
∆
.
where
∆ = (2p′ + p′′xB − c′′A(xB))(2p′ + p′′xC − c′′A(xC)) − (p′ + p′′xB)(p′ + p′′xC).
From the stability conditions we can assume p′ − c′′A(xB) < 0. Then, similarly to the previous
case we have dxBdr < 0 and
dxC
dr < 0.
4.4 Entry with a license to one firm case
Next suppose that Firm A enters the market and sells a license to one firm, Firm C. The cost
function of Firm C is cA(xC). The profits of Firms A, B and C are written as
piA = p(xA + xB + xC)xA − cA(xA),
piB = p(xA + xB + xC)xB − cB(xB),
piC = p(xA + xB + xC)xC − cA(xC) − r xC − L.
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The first order conditions for profit maximization are
p + p′xA − c′A(xA) = 0, (2a)
p + p′xB − c′B(xB) = 0, (2b)
p + p′xC − c′A(xC) − r = 0. (2c)
Denote the equilibrium profits and the license fee in this case by pie1A , pi
e1
B , pi
e1
C and L
e1.
Diﬀerentiating the first order conditions with respect to r , we obtain
dxA
dr
=
σA(σB − θB)
Γ
,
dxB
dr
=
σB(σA − θA)
Γ
,
dxC
dr
=
θAθB − σAσB
Γ
,
where
θA = 2p′ + p′′xA − c′′A(xA), θB = 2p′ + p′′xB − c′′B(xB), θC = 2p′ + p′′xC − c′′A(xC),
σA = p
′ + p′′xA, σB = p′ + p′′xB, σC = p′ + p′′xC,
and
Γ = θAθBθC − θAσBσC − θBσAσC − θCσAσB + 2σAσBσC .
From the second order conditions and the stability conditions, θ’s are negative, Γ < 0, and the
absolute values of θ’s are larger than those of σ’s. Then, we have dxCdr < 0. When the goods of
the firms are strategic substitutes, σA < 0, σB < 0, σC < 0, and when the goods are strategic
complements, σA > 0, σB > 0, σC > 0. We have dxAdr > 0,
dxB
dr > 0 in the former case, and
dxA
dr < 0,
dxB
dr < 0 in the latter case.
4.5 Entry with licenses to two firms case
Next suppose that Firm A enters the market and sells licenses to Firms B and C. The cost
functions of Firms B and C are cA(·). The profits of Firms A, B and C are written as
piA = p(xA + xB + xC)xA − cA(xA),
piB = p(xA + xB + xC)xB − cA(xB) − r xB − L,
piC = p(xA + xB + xC)xC − cA(xC) − r xC − L.
The first order conditions for profit maximization are
p + p′xA − c′A(xA) = 0,
p + p′xB − c′A(xB) − r = 0,
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p + p′xC − c′A(xC) − r = 0.
Denote the equilibrium profits and the license fee by pie2A , pi
e2
B , pi
e2
C and L
e2. In this case
xB = xC and pie2B = pi
e2
C .
Diﬀerentiating the first order conditions with respect to r , we obtain
dxA
dr
=
2σA(σB − θB)
Γ
,
dxB
dr
=
dxC
dr
=
θA(θB − σB)
Γ
.
where
θA = 2p′ + p′′xA − c′′A(xA), θB = 2p′ + p′′xB − c′′A(xB), θC = 2p′ + p′′xC − c′′A(xC),
σA = p
′ + p′′xA, σB = p′ + p′′xB, σC = p′ + p′′xC,
and
Γ = θAθBθC − θAσBσC − θBσAσC − θCσAσB + 2σAσBσC .
We have θB = θC and σB = σC . Similarly to the previous case we get dxBdr < 0 and
dxC
dr < 0.
dxA
dr > 0 if σA < 0, and
dxA
dr < 0 if σA > 0.
5 Royalty and license fees in the cases of licenses with entry
In the case of licenses with entry the license fee is equal to the usual willingness to pay for
the incumbent firms. We follow the arguments by Kamien and Tauman (1986) and Sen and
Tauman (2007) about license fee by auction.
5.1 License to one firm
The willingness to pay for each incumbent firm is equal to
the diﬀerence between its profit when only this firm uses the new technology with
entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only the rival firm buys the license
with entry of the innovating firm.
This is because the incumbent firms know that there will be one licensee regardless of whether
or not it buys a license. Then, the fixed license fee is
Le1 = (pie1C + Le1) − pie1B .
This equation means pie1C = pi
e1
B . The total payoﬀ of Firm A in this case is written as
ϕe1 = pie1A + r xC + L
e1 = pxA − cA(xA) + pxC − cA(xC) − (pxB − cB(xB)).
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Using the first order conditions, the condition for maximization of ϕwith respect to r is written
as follows.
dϕe1
dr
= r
dxC
dr
+ p′(xC − xB)dxAdr + p
′(xA − xB)dxCdr + p
′(xA + xC)dxBdr = 0,
Then, we get the optimal royalty rate for the innovator as follows.
r˜e1 = − p
′
dxC
dr
[
(xC − xB)dxAdr + (xA − xB)
dxC
dr
+ (xA + xC)dxBdr
]
. (3)
This may be positive or negative,
5.2 Licenses to two firms
The willingness to pay for each incumbent firm in this case is equal to
the diﬀerence between its profit when two firms use the new technology with entry
of the innovating firm and its profit when only the rival firm buys the license with
entry of the innovating firm.
This is because the incumbent firms know that there will be one licensee when it does not buy
a license. In this case there is a minimum bidding price which is equal to the willingness to
pay for the incumbents because without the minimum bidding price no firm makes a positive
bid. The fixed license fee is
Le2 = (pie2C + Le2) − pie1B .
This means pie2C = pi
e1
B . The total payoﬀ of Firm B is written as
ϕe2 = pie1A + r xB + r xC + 2L
e2 = pxA − cA(xA) + pxB − cA(xB) + pxC − cA(xC) − 2pie1B .
Note that pie1B is constant and irrelevant to determination of the royalty rate in this case. Using
the first order conditions, the condition for maximization of ϕ with respect to r is written as
follows.
dϕe2
dr
= r
(
dxB
dr
+
dxC
dr
)
+ p′(xB + xC)dxAdr + p
′(xA + xB)dxCdr + p
′(xA + xC)dxBdr .
The optimal royalty rate is
r˜e2 = − p
′
dxB
dr +
dxC
dr
[
(xB + xC)dxAdr + (xA + xB)
dxC
dr
+ (xA + xC)dxBdr
]
.
If the goods are strategic complements, r˜e2 > 0 because dxAdr < 0,
dxB
dr < 0 and
dxC
dr < 0. If the
goods are strategic substitutes, it may be positive or negative.
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6 Royalty and license fees in the case of licenses without
entry: two-step auction
6.1 One-step auction
If the licenses are auctioned oﬀ to the incumbent firms by one-step auction, the license fee is
determined by the usual willingness to pay for the incumbent firms described in Kamien and
Tauman (1986) and Sen and Tauman (2007).
6.1.1 License to one firm
The willingness to pay for each incumbent firm is equal to
the diﬀerence between its profit when only this firm uses the new technology
without entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only the rival firm buys
the license without entry of the innovating firm.
Then, the fixed license fee is
Ll1 = (pil1C + Ll1) − pil1B .
This equation means pil1C = pi
l1
B . Denote L in this case by L˜
l1, and denote the total payoﬀ of the
innovator by ϕ˜l1 to distinguish it from the total payoﬀ in the two-step auction case, which is
denoted by ϕˆl1. ϕ˜l1 is
ϕ˜l1 = r xC + L˜
l1 = pxC − cA(xC) − (pxB − cB(xB)).
Using the first order conditions, the condition for maximization of ϕ˜l1 with respect to r is
written as
dϕ˜l1
dr
= r
dxC
dr
+ p′xC
dxB
dr
− p′xB dxCdr = 0.
Then, we obtain the optimal royalty rate for the innovator as follows.
r l1 =
p′
dxC
dr
(
xB
dxC
dr
− xC dxBdr
)
. (4)
Denote it by r˜ l1. If the goods are strategic substitutes, r˜ l1 < 0 because dxBdr > 0; if the goods
are strategic complements, it may be positive or negative because dxCdr < 0 and
dxB
dr < 0.
6.1.2 Licenses to two firms
The willingness to pay for each incumbent firm in this case is equal to
the diﬀerence between its profit when two firms use the new technology without
entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only the rival firm buys the license
without entry of the innovating firm.
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There is a minimum bidding price which is equal to the willingness to pay for the incumbents.
The license fee is
Ll2 = (pil2C + Ll2) − pil1B .
This means pil2C = pi
l1
B . Denote L in this case by L˜
l2, and denote the total payoﬀ of the innovator
by ϕ˜l2. It is
ϕ˜l2 = r(xB + xC) + 2L˜l2 = pxB − cA(xB) + pxC − cA(xC) − 2pil1B .
Note that pil1B is constant and irrelevant to determination of the royalty rate. The condition for
maximization of ϕ˜l2 with respect to r is
dϕ˜l2
dr
= r
(
dxB
dr
+
dxC
dr
)
+ p′xC
dxB
dr
+ p′xB
dxC
dr
= 0.
The optimal royalty rate is
r˜ l2 = − p
′
dxB
dr +
dxC
dr
(
xC
dxB
dr
+ xB
dxC
dr
)
.
This is positive.
6.2 Two-step auction
We consider a two-step auction for each case.
6.2.1 License to one firm
In this case the two-step auction is practiced as follows.
1. The first step.
The innovating firm sells a license to one firm at auction without its entry conditional
on that the bidding price must not be smaller than the minimum bidding price, which
is equal to the willingness to pay for the incumbent firms described below, and the
innovating firm imposes a predetermined (positive or negative) royalty per output on the
licensee. A firm with the maximum bidding price gets a license. If both firms make bids
at the same price, one firm is chosen at random. If no firm makes a bid, then the auction
proceeds to the next step.
2. The second step.
The innovating firm sells a license to one firm at auction with its entry. Then, the
willingness to pay for each incumbent firm in this step is
pie1C + L
e1 − pie1B .
At the first step of the auction, each incumbent firm has a will to pay the following license fee;
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the diﬀerence between its profit when only this firm uses the new technology
without entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only the rival firm buys
the license with entry of the innovating firm.
Then, the license fee is
Ll1 = (pil1C + Ll1) − pie1B .
This equation means pil1C = pi
e1
B . Denote L
l1 in this case by Lˆl1.
In the first step each incumbent firm has an incentive to make a bid with the license fee Ll1
when the other firm does not make a bid. On the other hand, it does not have an incentive to
make a bid when the other firm makes a bid.
We need the minimum bidding price Ll1 because the profit of a non-licensee is pil1B which is
larger than pie1B . If there is no minimum price, when one of the incumbent firms makes a bid
which is slightly but strictly smaller than this price, the other firm does not have an incentive
to outperform this bidding.
Denote the total payoﬀ of the innovator in this case by ϕˆl1. Then,
ϕˆl1 = r xC + Lˆ
l1 = pxC − cA(xC) − pie1B .
Note that pie1B is a constant number in this case which is determined in the entry with a license
to one firm case. The condition for maximization of ϕ with respect to r is
dϕˆl1
dr
= r
dxC
dr
+ p′xC
dxB
dr
= 0.
Then, we obtain the optimal royalty rate for the innovator as follows.
r l1 = − p
′
dxC
dr
xC
dxB
dr
.
Denote it by rˆ l1. If the goods are strategic substitutes, rˆ l1 < 0 because dxBdr > 0, and if the
goods are strategic complements, rˆ l1 > 0 because dxBdr < 0.
6.2.2 Licenses to two firms
We consider the following two-step auction
1. The first step.
The innovating firm sells licenses to two firms at auction without its entry conditional
on that the bidding price must not be smaller than the minimum bidding price, which
is equal to the willingness to pay for the incumbent firms described below and both
firms make bids, and the innovating firm imposes a predetermined (positive or negative)
royalty per output on the licensee. If both firms make bids, they get licenses. If at least
one of the firms does not make a bid, then the auction proceeds to the next step.
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2. The second step.
The innovating firm sells a license to one firm at auction with its entry. Then, the
willingness to pay for each incumbent firm in this step is
pie1C + L
e1 − pie1B .
At the first step of the auction, each incumbent firm has a will to pay the following license fee;
the diﬀerence between its profit when two firms use the new technology without
entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only the rival firm buys the license
with entry of the innovating firm.
The minimum bidding price should be equal to this willingness to pay. Then, the license fee is
Ll2 = (pil2C + Ll2) − pie1B .
This means pil2C = pi
e1
B . Denote L
l2 in this case by Lˆl2.
In the first step each incumbent firm has an incentive to make a bid when the other firm
makes a bid because if it does not make a bid, the auction proceeds to the next step.
Denote the total payoﬀ of the innovator in this case by ϕˆl2. It is
ϕˆl2 = r(xB + xC) + 2Lˆl2 = pxB − cA(xB) + pxC − cA(xC) − 2pie1B .
Note that pie1B is constant and irrelevant to determination of the royalty rate in this case. The
condition for maximization of ϕˆl2 with respect to r is
dϕˆl2
dr
= r
(
dxB
dr
+
dxC
dr
)
+ p′xC
dxB
dr
+ p′xB
dxC
dr
= 0.
The optimal royalty rate is
r l2 = − p
′
dxB
dr +
dxC
dr
(
xC
dxB
dr
+ xB
dxC
dr
)
.
Denote it by rˆ l2. We see rˆ l2 = r˜ l2, but the total payoﬀ of the innovator with two-step auction
and that without two-step auction are diﬀerent because the fixed license fees in two cases are
diﬀerent.
We summarize the results about the optimal royalty rates for the innovator in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. Entry with license to one firm case The optimal royalty rate may be positive
or negative.
Entry with licenses to two firms case If the goods are strategic complements, the optimal
royalty rate is positive. If the goods are strategic substitutes, it may be positive or
negative.
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License to one firmwithout entry case not using two-step auction If the goods are strategic
substitutes, the optimal royalty rate is negative. If the goods are strategic complements,
it may be positive or negative.
License to one firmwithout entry case using two-step auction If the goods are strategic sub-
stitutes, the optimal royalty rate is negative. If the goods are strategic complements, it is
positive.
Licenses to two firms without entry case using or not using two-step auction The optimal roy-
alty rate is positive.
6.3 Credibility of two-step auction
In this subsection we will prove our main results. The innovating firm uses a two-step auction
if and only if the threat by the existence of the second step of the auction is credible, and it is
credible if and only if the total payoﬀ of the innovating firm when it enters the market with a
license to one firm is larger than its payoﬀ when it does not enter and sells a license to one firm
not using a two-step auction. Therefore, if
pie1A + r˜
e1xC + L
e1 ≥ r˜ l1xC + L˜l1,
two-step auction is credible. On the other hand, if
r˜ l1xC + L˜
l1 > pie1A + r˜
e1xC + L
e1,
two-step auction is not credible.
We show the following proposition. Note that cA(0) = 0, that is, the fixed cost of the new
technology is zero.
Proposition 2. 1. If the marginal cost of the new technology is constant, that is, the cost
function is linear, entry with a license to one firm case and license to one firm without
entry case are equivalent. The marginal cost of the old technology (technology of the
non-licensee) need not be constant.
2. If the cost function of the firms is strictly convex, two-step auction is credible.
3. If the cost function of the firms is strictly concave, two-step auction is not credible.
Proof. 1. First consider the case of entry with a license to one firm. Let x¯ = xA + xC .
Denote the constant marginal cost of the new technology by c, and denote the total payoﬀ
of the innovator by ϕe1. It is written as
ϕe1 = px¯ − cx¯ − (pxB − cB(xB)).
If the marginal cost of the new technology is constant, c′′A = 0. Thus,
dx¯
dr =
dxA
dr +
dxC
dr
and dxBdr in Section 4.4 are written as
dx¯
dr
=
p′(2p′ + p′′xB − c′′B(xB))
Γ
=
p′θB
Γ
,
dxB
dr
=
−p′(p′ + p′′xB)
Γ
= −p
′σB
Γ
.
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The condition for maximization of ϕe1 with respect to r is
(p + p′ x¯ − c − p′xB)dx¯dr − (p + p
′xB − c′B(xB) − p′ x¯)
dxB
dr
= 0. (5)
From (2a) and (2c) we have
p + p′ x¯ − c = r − p + c.
From this and (2b), (5) is rewritten as
(r − p + c − p′xB)dx¯dr + p
′ x¯
dxB
dr
= 0.
Then, the optimal royalty rate is written as
r˜e1 = p − c + p′xB + p′ x¯σB
θB
.
The first order condition for Firm C, (2c), with r = r˜e1 is rewritten as
p + p′xC − c −
(
p − c + p′xB + p′ x¯σB
θB
)
= p′(xC − xB) − p′ x¯σB
θB
= 0.
With xA + xC = x¯, this and the first order condition for Firm A, (2a),
p + p′xA − c = 0
imply
p + p′ x¯ − c − p′xB − p′ x¯σB
θB
= 0. (6)
Next consider the case of license to one firm without entry not using a two-step auction.
Let x¯ = xC . Denote the total payoﬀ of the innovator in this case by ϕ˜l1. It is written as
ϕ˜l1 = px¯ − cx¯ − (pxB − cB(xB)).
This is the same as ϕe1. If c′′A = 0,
dx¯
dr =
dxC
dr and
dxB
dr in Section 4.2 are written as
dx¯
dr
=
θB
∆
,
dxB
dr
= −σB
∆
,
θB and σB in this case are the same as those in the previous case. The condition for
maximization of ϕ˜l1 with respect to r is
(p + p′ x¯ − c − p′xB)dx¯dr − (p + p
′xB − c′B(xB) − p′ x¯)
dxB
dr
= 0. (7)
From (1a) and (1b), (7) is rewritten as
(r − p′xB)dx¯dr + p
′ x¯
dxB
dr
= 0.
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Then, the optimal royalty rate is
r˜ l1 = p′xB + p′ x¯
σB
θB
.
The first order condition for Firm C, (1a), with xC = x¯ and r = r˜ l1 is rewritten as
p + p′ x¯ − c − p′xB − p′ x¯σB
θB
= 0. (8)
(6) and (8) are the same. Therefore, two cases are equivalent.
2. ϕe1 with x¯ = xA + xC is
ϕe1 = px¯ − cA(xA) − cA(xC) − (pxB − cB(xB)).
ϕ˜l1 with x¯ = xC is written as
ϕ˜l1 = px¯ − cA(x¯) − (pxB − cB(xB)).
If the cost function of the new technology, cA(·), is strictly convex,
cA(xC) < xCxA + xC cA(xA + xC) +
(
1 − xC
xA + xC
)
cA(0) = xCxA + xC cA(xA + xC),
cA(xA) < xAxA + xC cA(xA + xC) +
(
1 − xA
xA + xC
)
cA(0) = xAxA + xC cA(xA + xC).
Then,
cA(xA) + cA(xC) < cA(xA + xC).
Separation of production between two firms is more eﬃcient than concentration to one
firm. Thus, ϕe1 is larger than ϕ˜l1 when xA + xC in the case of entry with a license and
xC in the case of license without entry are equal, and the maximum value of ϕe1 is larger
than the maximum value of ϕ˜l1. Hence, two-step auction is credible.
3. Similarly to the case of strictly convex cost function, if the cost function of the new
technology, cA(·), is strictly concave, we find
cA(xA) + cA(xC) > cA(xA + xC).
Concentration of production to one firm is more eﬃcient than separation between two
firms. Thus, ϕ˜l1 is larger than ϕe1 when xA + xC in the case of entry with a license and
xC in the case of license without entry are equal, and the maximum value of ϕ˜l1 is larger
than the maximum value of ϕe1. Hence, two-step auction is not credible.
□
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Figure 1: Optimal strategy for the innovator when 0 < cA <
√
3 − 1
7 An example
As an example we assume that the inverse demand function is
p = a − xA − xB − xC,
when Firm A enters. When it does not enter, p = a − xB − xC . a is a positive constant. The
cost functions of the firms are quadratic. They are 12cAx
2
A for Firm A. For Firm B and C with
the old technology they are 12cBx
2
B and
1
2cBx
2
C . With the new technology they are
1
2cAx
2
B and
1
2cAx
2
C . We present summaries of the calculation results. About details of λA, λB, λC and λD
please see Appendix.
License to one firmwithout entry not using two-step auction case Theoptimal royalty rate
and the total payoﬀ of the innovator are
r˜ l1 = − a
cB + 2
< 0,
r˜ l1xC + L˜
l1 =
a2(c2B − cAcB + 2cB − 2cA + 1)
2(cB + 2)(cAcB + 2cB + 2cA + 3) .
Entry without license case The profit of the innovator is
pie0A =
a2(cA + 2)(cB + 1)2
2(cAcB + 2cB + 3cA + 4)2 .
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Figure 2: Optimal strategy for the innovator when cA >
√
3 − 1
Entry with a license to one firm case The optimal royalty rate and the total payoﬀ of the
innovator are
r˜e1 =
a(cA + 1)2(c2B − cAcB − 2cA − 2)
(cAcB + 2cB + 2cA + 3)(c2AcB + 4cAcB + cB + 2c2A + 6cA + 2)
,
pie1A + r˜
e1xC + L˜
e1
=
a2(2c2Ac2B + 4cAc2B + c2B − c3AcB + 2c2AcB + 7cAcB + 2cB − 2c3A − 2c2A + 2cA + 1)
2(cAcB + 2cB + 2cA + 3)(c2AcB + 4cAcB + cB + 2c2A + 6cA + 2)
.
Entry with licenses to two firms case The optimal royalty rate and the total payoﬀ of the
innovator are
r˜e2 =
2a(cA + 1)2
(cA + 2)(c2A + 6cA + 2)
> 0,
pie2A + r˜
e2(xB + xC) + 2L˜e2
=
a2λA
2(cA + 2)(c2A + 6cA + 2)(cAcB + 2cB + 2cA + 3)2(c2AcB + 4cAcB + cB + 2c2A + 6cA + 2)2
.
License to one firmwithout entry case using two-step auction case Theoptimal royalty rate
and the total payoﬀ of the innovator are
rˆ l1 = − a(cB + 1)(cB + 2)(cAcB + 2cB + 2cA + 2) > 0,
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rˆ l1xC+Lˆ
l1 =
a2λB
λC
.
Licenses to two firms without entry case using two-step auction case Theoptimal royalty
rate and the total payoﬀ of the innovator are
rˆ l2 =
a
cA + 4
> 0,
rˆ l2(xB + xC) + 2Lˆl2
=
a2λD
(cA + 4)(cAcB + 2cB + 2cA + 3)2(c2AcB + 4cAcB + cB + 2c2A + 6cA + 2)2
.
Comparing pie1A + r˜
e1xC + L˜e1 and r˜ l1xC + L˜l1,
pie1A + r˜
e1xC + L˜
e1 − (r˜ l1xC + L˜l1)
=
a2cA(cB + 1)(cAc2B + 5cAcB + 2cB + 6cA + 2)
2(cB + 2)(cAcB + 2cB + 2cA + 3)(c2AcB + 4cAcB + cB + 2c2A + 6cA + 2)
.
Therefore, two-step auction is credible. About this example we get the following results.
1. If 0 < cA <
√
3 − 1, licenses to two firms without entry strategy is optimal for the
innovator. Please see Figure 1.
2. If cA >
√
3 − 1, entry with licenses to two firms strategy is optimal for the innovator.
Please see Figure 2.
8 Concluding remarks and the future research
Appendix: Details of calculations
λA =3c8Ac
4
B + 42c
7
Ac
4
B + 236c
6
Ac
4
B + 684c
5
Ac
4
B + 1095c
4
Ac
4
B + 962c
3
Ac
4
B + 438c
2
Ac
4
B
+ 96cAc4B + 8c
4
B − 2c9Ac3B − 8c8Ac3B + 114c7Ac3B + 1012c6Ac3B + 3364c5Ac3B + 5696c4Ac3B
+ 5160c3Ac
3
B + 2424c
2
Ac
3
B + 552cAc
3
B + 48c
3
B − 12c9Ac2B − 112c8Ac2B − 216c7Ac2B
+ 995c6Ac
2
B + 5454c
5
Ac
2
B + 10628c
4
Ac
2
B + 10296c
3
Ac
2
B + 5103c
2
Ac
2
B + 1230cAc
2
B + 114c
2
B
− 24c9AcB − 256c8AcB − 896c7AcB − 700c6AcB + 2970c5AcB + 8444c4AcB + 9262c3AcB
+ 4964c2AcB + 1284cAcB + 128cB − 16c9A − 176c8A − 688c7A − 1060c6A + 92c5A + 2436c4A
+ 3252c3A + 1908c
2
A + 528cA + 56,
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λB =c
6
Ac
6
B + 12c
5
Ac
6
B + 54c
4
Ac
6
B + 112c
3
Ac
6
B + 105c
2
Ac
6
B + 36cAc
6
B + 4c
6
B − c7Ac5B + 74c5Ac5B
+ 406c4Ac
5
B + 876c
3
Ac
5
B + 826c
2
Ac
5
B + 293cAc
5
B + 34c
5
B − 10c7Ac4B − 53c6Ac4B + 90c5Ac4B
+ 1125c4Ac
4
B + 2716c
3
Ac
4
B + 2641c
2
Ac
4
B + 976cAc
4
B + 119c
4
B − 40c7Ac3B − 264c6Ac3B
− 338c5Ac3B + 1258c4Ac3B + 4179c3Ac3B + 4372c2Ac3B + 1705cAc3B + 220c3B − 80c7Ac2B
− 552c6Ac2B − 1148c5Ac2B + 89c4Ac2B + 3210c3Ac2B + 3928c2Ac2B + 1650cAc2B + 227c2B
− 80c7AcB − 544c6AcB − 1272c5AcB − 852c4AcB + 1016c3AcB + 1800c2AcB + 840cAcB
+ 124cB − 32c7A − 208c6A − 496c5A − 460c4A + 32c3A + 324c2A + 176cA + 28,
λC =2(cB + 2)(cAcB + 2cB + 2cA + 2)(cAcB + 2cB + 2cA + 3)2(c2AcB + 4cAcB + cB
+ 2c2A + 6cA + 2)2,
λD =c
6
Ac
4
B + 12c
5
Ac
4
B + 54c
4
Ac
4
B + 112c
3
Ac
4
B + 105c
2
Ac
4
B + 36cAc
4
B + 4c
4
B − c7Ac3B − 4c6Ac3B
+ 34c5Ac
3
B + 250c
4
Ac
3
B + 584c
3
Ac
3
B + 568c
2
Ac
3
B + 205cAc
3
B + 24c
3
B − 6c7Ac2B − 44c6Ac2B
− 46c5Ac2B + 347c4Ac2B + 1092c3Ac2B + 1152c2Ac2B + 448cAc2B + 57c2B − 12c7AcB − 96c6AcB
− 212c5AcB + 88c4AcB + 871c3AcB + 1062c2AcB + 455cAcB + 64cB − 8c7A − 64c6A
− 160c5A − 76c4A + 254c3A + 384c2A + 182cA + 28,
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